Have Script, Will Destroy (Lessons in DoS)
By: Brian Martin
I began writing this article almost one year ago, after the onslaught
attacks being launched against
various networks throughout the Internet. At the time, the newly
discovered Denial of Service (DoS) attack was a crippling tool designed
for one purpose; remotely disabling machines by flooding them with
more traffic than they could handle. The smurf attack was the
first well known (and well abused) DoS attack that could effectively
cripple any network, regardless of size or bandwidth. This presented
a new problem to network administrators and security personnel worldwide.
Also known as Network Saturation Attacks or Bandwidth Consumption
Attacks, the new breed of DoS
attacks flood a remote network with an staggering amount of traffic.
Routers and servers targeted would go into overdrive attempting to route
or handle each packet as it came in. As the network receives more and
more of these illegitimate packets, it quickly begins to cause legitimate
traffic like web and mail to be denied. In minutes, all network activity
is shut down as the attack consumes all available network resources.
Prior to bandwidth consumption attacks, most DoS attacks involved sending
very few malformed packets to a remote server that would cause it to crash. This
occured because of bugs in the way many servers handled the malformed
packets. Malformed packets (also known as Magic Packets) consisted of network protocol options that were
out of sequence, improperly matched, or too large. As a result, a server
receiving these packets had no rules or guidelines dictating how it should
behave when processing the malformed packet. The result was a system panic
or crash that would basically shut the machine down or force it to reboot.
Perhaps the most well known example of this type of attack is the
Regardless of ethics or motives, Magic Packet DoS attacks showed an inkling
of grace in their execution. A single packet sent from one server to another,
causing it to crash or reboot was a targeted attack. The precision with
which this type of attack is carried out is analogous to a scalpel in
surgery. Network consumption attacks on the other hand involve millions
of packets. Worse, once launched the attack was no respector of those
standing between the launch point and the target network. Often times
thousands of customers sharing bandwidth with the target would be adversely
affected as well. A single attack of this nature had the ability to
knock thousands of machines off the Internet in a single swoop. Such
attacks are the equivalent of using a broadsword to do surgery.
The Next Generation
Attacks like the smurf DoS have a cascading affect that can
be seen as a virtual avalanche. The starting point is nothing more than
a few pebbles and snowballs (packets). As they travel downhill (along
the path of routers to the target), they accumulate more mass and trigger
the release of more pebbles. By the time the falling material hits
the bottom of the mountain (the target), it is swamped in large amounts
of snow and rocks. Despite the effectiveness of this attack, there is
a single point from which the attack is launched. If an attack is detected
early enough, it is possible to filter out the offending packets before
they leave the original network.
The next generation of Denial of Service attacks are known as Distributed
Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. Expanding on the idea of network
saturation attacks, DDoS effectively does the same thing but utilizes
several launch points. The philosophy and objective of this is twofold.
First, if a single machine being used to launch an attack is discovered
and disabled, the overall attack proceeds with near full force. Second,
by utilizing several launch points on different networks, an attacker is
able to shut down larger networks that might not otherwise be affected
by a single flood.
Taking Down the Big Boys
Prior to launching this form of DDoS flood, the attacker must first
compromise various hosts on different networks. The more networks and
used as launch points, the more potent the attack. Once each host had been
broken into, they would install a DDoS client program on the machine that
would sit ready to attack. Once the network of compromised servers was
configured with the new client program, the attacker could send a quick
command from the DDoS server software triggering each machine to launch
[chart comparing 56k vs cable vs t1 vs t3]
Until this last wave of DDoS attacks, it was generally assumed that
hosts residing on large pipes (connections with incredible bandwidth)
could not be seriously affected by network saturation attacks. As large
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) are finding out, this is no longer
the case. By using several smaller network connections, an attacker
can eventually saturate the biggest ISPs and consume all of their
bandwidth. This was demonstrated most effectively with the
Buy.com and other large scale web sites.
Difficulty in Tracking
Neophytes to networking always seem to question why these attacks are
not tracked down, and the legs of the perpetrator not broken. It is a rare
case to see ISPs interested in tracking down the individual(s) behind
these attacks. Rather than take the time and effort to perform an
investigation (which is lenghty), most ISPs realize that a quick
filter denying ALL traffic to the site being attacked is a better
solution. In essence, the ISP does the job of the person launching the
attack and does it much more effeciently. As you can imagine, that is not
exactly a deterrent for those committing these attacks.
One of the primary reasons investigations of DoS attacks is lengthy
is it involves tracking down the packets hitting the target. Rather
than leave the launch point with the IP address of the machine actually
being used, the packets are tagged with forged source IP addresses.
Since the IP information in each packet varies wildly, and since the
addresses can not be trusted, a network administrator must trace
the packets back to the source one router at a time. This involves
connecting to the router (often times this must be done at the physical
console for security reasons), setting up a filter or sniffer to detect
where the packets are coming from before arriving at that particular
router, and then move to the new offending router. This presents problems
when you consider a single packet may cross as many as thirty routers
owned by ten different companies.
The act of forging the source IP of a packet is called
and is the basis for a wide variety of network attacks. One of the original
intentions of a Denial of Service attack was to knock a machine off the
network in order for you to assume it's identity. Once you masquerade
as that machine, it is possible to intercept traffic intended for
it as well as gain access to other machines on the target network via
trusted host relationships. Attackers today seem to have lost all
focus on the reason one would committ a DoS attack.
Save The Day Already!
Denial of Service attacks are not new. They have existed in one
form or another since computers were invented. In the past they involved
consuming resources like disk drive space, memory or CPU cycles.
Those not familiar with how computers operate often scream for quick
solutions to the various DoS attacks that plague our networks. Unfortunately,
this is easier said than done.
Every weekday morning and afternoon millions of Americans go to and from
work. They pile on to two and four lane freeways only to move at a crawl.
Travelling ten miles in one hour is a common occurance for those fighting
rush hour traffic in heavily trafficed areas of business districts in
cities across the nation. Every day they carry out this ritual, screaming
and cursing the thousands of other drivers clogging the roads, and day
after day the problem does not fix itself. Be it packets or cars, it
is very well established that enough of either will overcrowd a road
or network connection. At a given point, too many of either will bring
all traffic to a standstill. Why isn't the traffic problem solved?
We all know the solution is bigger and better roads, more carpooling,
diverse schedules, and more common sense when behind the wheel. Fat
chance that will happen anytime soon. On the flip side, it is very
unlikely that they will fix every router on every network and install
mechanisms to help avoid network saturation attacks.
In the long run, it is a rather simple fix that could help eliminate
these attacks. Any network device that accepts or passes network traffic
can be designed to monitor activity better. If a web server is receiving
too many hits, it starts rejecting new connections so that existing
connections can still view pages or interact with the site. This practice
is called throttling or bandwidth limiting
and is designed to prevent excessive connections,
conserve resources and keep things operating correctly. Unfortunately,
this philosophy has not carried over to routers (the machines that
pass all internet traffic) so network consumption attacks go on unchecked.
A relatively few amount of networks have learned this is a good solution
to flood attacks. As such, their routers are designed to monitor traffic
and quit passing illegitimate traffic once detected. The problem with
this approach is that once the flood of packets have hit the remote
network, the damage is done. The downside to this mechanism is the
added latency as the router checks each and every packet that passes
through it. Because of this slowdown, ISPs hesitate implementing this
In order to make connection throttling effective, every network router
should have this mechanism implemented. This would allow a router close
to the source of the attack to detect the illicit traffic and put up
a filter that rejected it before it left the launch point. This invariably
leads to the question "How do you know if traffic is illegitimate?"
Looking back to the section on IP spoofing, we can easily create a quick
solution to the problem. In fact, this mechanism is found in most Firewalls
In the diagram above, we show a forged packet with the IP address of
18.104.22.168. It stands to reason that such a packet would not legitimately
be travelling around a network designated by the 1.2.3.x subnet. Because
of this, any router on that network (especially the one acting as a gateway
to the outside world) receiving that packet should drop it. Instead of
blindly passing the packet on without question, routers should discriminate
against suspicious packets by refusing to pass them on to the next router
and setting off some kind of alarm for the administrator.
A second mechanism can be put into place that would help cut down on
these attacks. On any given day, there is an average amount of traffic
passed through any router. By monitoring these averages and applying
other common sense rules, routers could be made to throttle heavily
increased traffic. For example, if a router detected a sudden surge
in traffic to a destination machine in which every packet claims to
originate from a different IP address, that is a good sign of a
saturation attack using spoofed packets. Rather than pass that traffic
down the network, the router should throttle the traffic to avoid
the likely flood that will ensue.
As stated many times before, easier said than done. Implementing
these features falls on the many vendors of routers. Using these
routers on production networks on the open Internet is up to the
tens of thousands of companies maintaining a presence on the Internet.
These upgrades cost time and money, something companies hesitate
to invest; until the first time they are on the receiving end of
such an attack. Like most security incidents, companies tend to implement
reactive security measures, rarely proactive measures.
Why Ask Why?
Somewhere along the way, everyone wants to know why such attacks
are carried out. Using the recent series of attacks against Yahoo,
eBay and others is just as good example as any. To quash the distant
hopes of a reasonable explanation, "There is no good reason!".
Consider that your typical DDoS attack affects hundreds (if not
thousands) of machines, on a wide variety of networks. The single
purpose of the attack is to cripple or shut down the target site
so that it can not receive legitimate traffic. There are only a handful
of reasons for doing it at all, none of which are reasonable or
justifiable. In other words, DoS attacks are worthless and childish.
The first reason with perhaps the longest history is simple revenge.
Some site out there wronged you in some way. Perhaps they spammed you,
stopped hosting the free web pages they provided for you, fired your
father or committed some other transgression. DoS attacks are a form
of virtual revenge, especially against companies doing business over
the Internet. The primary argument here is that these attacks cause
problems for a number of ISPs, other customers who share bandwidth
with the target, as well as the satisfied customers of the site. This
goes back to the broadsword vs scalpel analogy.
The second reason has become rather trendy with novice script kiddies, second rate
web page defacers, and those under the illusion they are part of the
professional security community. "I did it to prove the system
was vulnerable!" This is perhaps the most pathetic justification for
launching a DoS attack. To many, this is no different than the attacker
setting off a large nuclear device right next to a corporate server
and then proclaiming "See! This can impact your operations!"
Of course it can, this has been proven a hundred times over.
The third reason I can come up with falls back to playground rules.
"If I can't play kickball, I'll throw the ball on the roof so no one
else can play either!" This third grade mentality is far from
justification of such attacks. Those wishing to exact some form of
punishment against a site should consider the diminished intellect
required to launch these attacks. There are better ways to deal with
Three types of people deserve the brunt of harsh insults and petty
name calling. Each are responsible for this problem plaguing
Internet users, and each could do their part to help stop it.
Each individual that carries out a DoS attack does so knowing full
well what it could result in if they are caught. Practically nothing.
There is precious little to deter someone from carrying out
such vicious attacks. The very few times administrators put effort into
tracking down a malicious user it results in them getting ousted from
the ISP. The next day, the offending user is back online accessing the
Internet via another ISP. Until the attack against Yahoo, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was not concerned over these attacks.
To date, the FBI has not managed to apprehend the perpetrator of a
devastating DoS attack against their own home page (www.fbi.gov).
For one reason or another they were seen as an annoyance, not a reason
for loss of business. Law Enforcement needs to take a bigger interest
in DoS attacks and start to punish those responsible. These types of
attacks should take any competant law enforcement agent a few hours of
tracking and maybe a handful of legitimate warrants.
Like the FBI, ISPs receiving these attacks need to take more proactive steps
in preventing DoS attacks. When they do occur, ISPs should also take more
time in tracking down the offending users and passing on the information
to appropriate law enforcement. Rather than silently kicking them off
the Internet for a day, taking a more active and public stance showing
that malicious activity will not be tolerated would have a better
effect. Those ISPs scared of retaliation need to remember that they
are in the best position to stop the attackers.
Last, the pathetic kids (literally and figuratively) committing these
attacks. In many cases, these attacks are launched with mystical scripts
written in foreign languages and just produce the desired affect. There
is no grace, no skill, and no intellect behind these attacks. You are not
a hacker and you do not deserve respect for your childish actions.
You are no better than the twisted individuals who spray a crowd
of innocent bystanders with a machine gun, only to nick your intended
target. If you can't express yourself better than a saturation attack,
and can't deal with being called a name or wronged somehow, seek help
offline. You sorely need it.
Article: Brian Martin (email@example.com)
Images: Dale Coddington (firstname.lastname@example.org)
Copyright 2000 Brian Martin